

ADMIRAL TURNER's REMARKS
TO
NATIONAL NEWSPAPERS ASSOCIATION
CIA AUDITORIUM
1530-1630, 9 March 1978

Good afternoon. I hope you enjoyed the multi-media presentation. It is one of the new initiatives we are exploring and was originally intended to be part of our highly publicized public tours. The story behind those tours is that we wanted to open up to the public more, so we decided we would look into the possibility of holding public tours of the CIA Headquarters Building. The media published that information as if it were an established fact before a decision had actually been made. Nonetheless, we went ahead, developed the presentation you just saw, worked out the procedures, and held some test tours with CIA families. Unfortunately, we found it was just impossible to conduct a truly interesting, worthwhile tour in the space we have and without tying up our working operation. Instead, we have decided that in the place of open public tours which could not hope to satisfy anticipated numbers, we would invite groups like yours here to be with us on a more personal basis. We are delighted you are one of the first organizations to share in this new program of greater openness, greater hospitality out here.

I think it is important that we share more of the intelligence community's activities with the public today for several reasons. Intelligence is more important to the United States today than it has ever been. If you look back, we have come from an era of total military superiority to one of relative parity. Under these circumstances, intelligence, the ability to know what the other fellow is doing, building, planning, is much more important. When we had overwhelming military power, relative to anyone else in the world, it was not always critical for us to be in the right place at the right time, with the right show of force. Today, the ability to anticipate and accurately assess situations can convey great military advantage.

If you look back to the end of World War II, we were also the dominant political power in the world. Most other nations followed our lead. Today, I cannot imagine even the smallest nation in the United Nations accepting openly another nation's

lead. That is just not the tenor of the times. Independence is their goal and properly so. I am not bemoaning either of these changes, I am just acknowledging the facts. But as a result, we must know more about the attitudes, outlooks, and aspirations of most other nations if we are to continue to hold our place in the world.

Thirty years ago we were economically independent. Today I hardly need mention our economic interdependence. As we turn down our thermostats in winter, we are all reminded of our dependence on the resources of other countries.

Another reason we are working to be more open is the result of the past three and a quarter years when the intelligence community came under intense public scrutiny and criticism, mainly in the media, some of it justified, some of it not. But today, having been exposed so much by this period of investigations by the Church Committee, the Pike Committee, the Rockefeller Commission, and the many stories in the media, the public has more questions about what we are doing, how we are doing it. I think it is up to us as a democratic institution of this country to respond to those questions.

I would like to respond to them today for you, by describing four ways in which American intelligence activities are evolving. I hope that in the process of doing this you will get some flavor of how we go about our business. Then I will stop and respond to your questions.

First, the product of intelligence is different today than it was 30 years ago last September when this Agency was founded. Look back. In those days we were primarily interested in Soviet military intelligence. We were also concerned with their Eastern European satellites, and with China, and Soviet forays in the Third World, but basically, our product was determined by where the Soviets were active and what they were doing.

One other characteristic of our activities was in the form of a response to these Soviet forays. America turned to its intelligence community not only for information--intelligence about what was going on--but also they asked the intelligence community to do something about those activities; to help influence those events. That activity is called covert political action. The Central Intelligence Agency was involved in 1953 when the government changed from communist to democratic

in Iran; in Guatemala in 1954; in the 1960s in Cuba; in Vietnam and, as recently as 1975, we conducted political action in Angola, until the Congress decided that was not what the country wanted and ordered a cessation.

But now look at how the world has changed since those early days when our intelligence was driven largely by Soviet military considerations. Today, we can't be limited to the Soviet Union and a dozen or so other countries of primary intelligence focus. We have important relations to one sort or another with most of the 150 some nations of the world. With most our relationship is not primarily military, but economic or political. So if we are to serve our decisionmakers in the government well, we in the intelligence community must provide good information about a wide range of geographical areas and on a diversity of topics, economic and political, as well as military.

Secondly, the country's attitude towards covert political action has changed. It is not something that the country feels it wants to do as much today as it did in the past. Beyond that, it is, in my opinion, not as applicable a tool in foreign policy today as it may have been in times past. So, there is much less emphasis in the Central Intelligence Agency today on covert political action than there has been heretofore. We should not and will not eschew that capability as a nation, because there are times when it may be far preferable to sending in the Marines. But, it must be used judiciously and it must be very strictly controlled. I will speak more on that in a moment.

Let me move on to the second major change in American intelligence today, and that is a new production line. We not only have a new product, but we have to produce it in a different way. Traditionally, intelligence has been produced by the human agent, the spy. You remember, Joshua sent two of them into Jericho before he marched around with his trumpets. The human agent has been the principal tool of intelligence until a decade and a half ago, when a technological revolution began in intelligence collection. Through complex, technical means today we can collect vast quantities of information. The data flow is increasing so rapidly, it almost swamps us. But, interestingly, this does not denigrate the role or the importance of the traditional human intelligence agent. Broadly speaking, a technical collection system can tell you what happened somewhere yesterday or today. Very seldom can you learn what will happen tomorrow. Policymakers want to know why they did that

yesterday, and what they are going to do tomorrow. Probing into intentions, plans, and thoughts is the unique forte of the human intelligence agent. So, the more we collect through technical wizardry, the more that must be complemented by information only the traditional human intelligence agent can provide.

The production line is different. Where before it was but one line, one process, today we must mesh a number of different types of intelligence collection machinery. They must be kept well-oiled, must be well-organized, and must be integrated. Different skills are required, different bureaucratic organizations, and different outlooks. We are adjusting to some of those changes now. I know that in the newspaper business it is always easy to make organizational changes. Nobody resists change in the structure of your organizations or titles, roles, salaries or anything else. But in the government bureaucracy it isn't quite like that. We have some problems when we want to make changes.

The third major change in intelligence is the dramatic change toward greater openness which I have already mentioned. While openness has inherent risks, considering that we are working against an implacable and secretive enemy, the KGB, I believe the benefits of such a policy outweigh those risks. In a democracy, no agency of the government can long survive without the fundamental understanding and support of the American people. The American people accepted the need for intelligence five years ago, along with the necessity of its secrecy. But after the questioning of the recent past, that is no longer the case. So we are opening up more. However, do not be misled. We cannot open up fully. In intelligence some things cannot be done unless they are done confidentially. So much must remain secret.

There are two basic functions in intelligence, one is collecting information and the other is analyzing and drawing conclusions from it. Even the best spy in the world usually cannot obtain a well-rounded, complete picture. The best he can do is give you clues to parts of what you are trying to find out. You take his clue and one from a technical intelligence system and your intuition and you piece them together like a picture puzzle. That is the estimating, the analytic process.

The first part is collecting. We cannot tell you very much about that process, because if we have to collect information clandestinely, it is generally because the other fellow

does not want to give it out. If you tell him how you are getting it, he turns it off. Generally, a countermeasure can be developed for every collection means. So, we have to be very careful what we say about how we collect information. People's lives are at stake; expensive technical collection systems that you and I have paid for as taxpayers are at stake. We also cannot share the unique information that gives the President, cabinet officers, military commanders, or ambassadors in the field, unique advantages because other people do not know that they have certain information. If, for example, you are negotiating a new contract with your labor union and somehow you have learned the union's negotiating position, you would not want them to know that because you would lose the advantage that information would give you. It is the same way in intelligence.

But, when it comes to talking about our analysis, our estimates, our conclusions, we can and want to share more. So, today, when we make an estimate, we look it over carefully and ask ourselves whether if we took out clues as to how we got the data, which we cannot afford to disclose, and we took out those pieces of intelligence which give our country unique advantages, would enough substance be left for it to be of value if published. Would it aid the general public and improve the quality of national debate? If it would, we publish it. We have published about two major estimates each week during the past year.

Last March we published one on the world energy crisis which said that in the next four or five years we believe the world will want to take out of the ground more oil than it will be able to. We did not say there is not enough oil down there, that we would run out of oil. We just said that sometime between now and the mid-1980s there will be pressure on prices because the curve of demand is going up more steeply than the curve of supply can be made to go up in that same time frame.

Last spring we published a study about the world steel situation. It said that there is no major steel producing country today working at more than 75% capacity. Many countries, particularly lesser developed countries, are bringing new steel producing capacity on line. We do not see, in the next four or five years, any prospect that demand will rise sufficiently to take advantage of the capacity that exists today, let alone that which is being added to the world's capacity.

We have done another study on international terrorism and its affect on American interests overseas. And we have completed one just recently on the comparative costs of Soviet and American military expenditures. We hope all of these are of some value and interest to the American public.

In addition, I hope that publishing more unclassified studies will help us improve the security of that information which must be kept secret. Obviously, the risk in moving to a policy of greater openness is that you may overstep bounds by opening the door a crack and legitimate secrets will leak out.

But another problem in keeping secrets is that when you have too many secrets, when everything is classified, it is difficult to keep them because people do not respect the classification. So, by reducing the corpus of classified information I hope to be able to protect it better and, at the same time, generate greater respect for it.

The fourth change in intelligence is the increase in controls, or oversight. Here we have a paradox. When you must operate partially in secrecy, you cannot, at the same time, have the kind of public oversight over our national institutions that Americans expect to have. We want to be able to check on what is being done in the Department of Commerce or Department of Labor, for example, so that we know the government is being run in accordance with the Constitution and the standards that have been established. You cannot quite do that with an intelligence agency. However, out of the crucible of these last three years of criticism a process has developed which provides for surrogate public oversight. You cannot all oversee us completely, but you have surrogates who can.

The President and the Vice President are very active participants in the intelligence process today. Beyond that, a special Intelligence Oversight Board, comprised of three distinguished citizens, functions as a check on me and on intelligence operations. They report only to the President and are not beholden to me in any way. Anyone in or out of the intelligence community can go to them directly to report wrongdoing. It is then their responsibility to investigate these allegations.

Most important perhaps has been the establishment in the last two years of two new committees in the Congress; one in each chamber, each dedicated to intelligence oversight. I

report to them regularly and fully about our intelligence activities. New rules in the President's recent Executive Order regulate this whole process and establish checkpoints where I must go through the Attorney General or the National Security Council to ensure harmony between the national policy and the intelligence activities; to ensure that intelligence activities are conducted with the full regard for the rights and privileges and the privacy of the American citizen. Although it is still evolving, I think the process is a good one.

The Congress is now working on legislative charters for the intelligence community. They will codify parts of the President's Executive Order and they will set forth in law the rules for operating the intelligence community.

Now, there are clearly risks in all this. If there is too much oversight, too many people in the act, the risk that important information will be leaked increases. If oversight becomes too detailed and consequently restrictive, there will be the risk that we will not be able to do the things that need to be done. In all candor, I cannot assure you today that those risks will not influence our activities in the future. It will take time to work out this process with the intelligence committees and the Intelligence Oversight Board in accordance with the new regulations to find the right balance; to determine how much oversight will be necessary to protect the American public and at the same time permit us adequate freedom to do the job.

As citizens we want our policymakers to have the best information on which to make the decisions which affect all of us. I am confident that this process will work itself out well, but it is not there yet. I think you will find it interesting over the next several years to watch it evolve, because of its potential importance for each of us. For the time being, I can assure you that we have the best intelligence service, the best intelligence capabilities in the world today, and I assure you that I intend to do all I can in the years ahead to keep it that way.

Thank you.

9 March 1978, Q&A's NATIONAL NEWSPAPER ASSOCIATION

Q. Inaudible

A. Nope. I take the position and the President has taken the position with the Congress that they would like to release a single budget figure for the total intelligence activity, not the Central Intelligence Agency but some other activities thrown in. That's alright with us but we are strongly opposed to releasing more than one figure, because then other people begin to see when your concentrating in this area, or your concentrating in that area and the countermeasures are developed more resident. And the reason we don't release the single figure you know we think can't safely be done, because if we release the single figure and Congress decides to release two and three figures we feel we're in trouble. So, we must share with the Congress the responsibility for protecting a single figure if it is released.

Q. Inaudible

A. We're very dependent, upon receiving into the intelligence community in general, the CIA in particular a modest number but a very high quality of young people every year. One of the things that I am doing out here is to emphasize the importance of our bringing in a steady flow every year, we've gone in humps and cycles. You've read about the dismissals and so on out here, the controversy, a large part of that is because we are congested at the top with wonderful people who have been here for 30 years, some of them - 25 to 30 years. We have got to move them out and let the younger people in and create a steady flow. What do you do? If you want to be an intelligence officer you have to have a college degree. Generally speaking your chances go up considerably if you have a masters degree and several years of working experience. You see, we are taking young people giving them courses of training and then putting them in positions of immense individual responsibility. It's not like a football team when you have a coach right there on the bench, you've got to shoulder it yourself on the field. Well, we are looking for people with a little of that added maturity. We take a number of people in the broad general arts. We have a lot of positions here for people with specific technical skills, all sorts of them, everything from psychology, to physics to chemistry to biology and all the way down the line. So, specifically, if your talking to a young person, study what you want to study, study what your good at. Prove yourself not only to be good at it, but also to be a sort of imaginative leader. Somebody who is interested in breaking new ground. Get a little experience, call up the nearest CIA office we are listed in the telephone book in 39 cities, write to me here at the CIA in Washington, D. C., and we will get someone out to talk to you.

Q. Inaudible

A. Only shortcoming, only change that I have been able to detect is there's be such a bias built up against intelligence in the Eastern seaboard and some on the western seaboard, the most prestigious

academic institutions that we are not getting as many people from them as before, but the number of applicants, the quality of applicants is greater. We're out at a hundred and forty or fifty campuses with our table and our recruiting booth openly every year. We are very pleased with the quality of people that we are getting as applicants. We take one out of 10 or something like that and I'm proud that the young people in the country have seen through some of the false criticisms of us and are willing to recognize the importance and the challenge of being in an organization like this.

Q. After observing the Soviets pencil names off a visa list, would I be correct in saying that they have a file on Americans and determine who they might have in their country and who they would not like to have?

A. Oh, I would think so, yes. But you know, recognize too that there is people we don't give visas to as well. I would think they are probably much more rigorous about this and keep dossiers on a lot more of us than we do of other people. We are more interested in criminals and that sort of thing. Yes, you know it is just not an open society over there and the amount of cost and effort that they put into keeping track of people who do come to their country is just ridiculous.

Q. Well I'll take if you had to go outside your own building here to check the security available inaudible

A. Well, we didn't check on any of you.

Q. Sir . . .

A. No,

Q. We have, we understood

A. No, we made no check on you. Now, I'll level with you how we go about this because we had a group that wanted to come out here, and talk to them a couple of weeks ago. It happened to be an international group and we said no because we just didn't want to go through the expense and effort of having to recheck this place afterwards that they didn't put a microphone or something down here. We take a chance with you because we gather you are all Americans - any one of you could be working for the KGB - we certainly hope not, but that sort of, you know we check this place every so often, but we limit ourself on the degree of risk we'll take by not having people who are just not citizens or Americans come in here. I do not work in the United States and I have no authority to check on you, run any kind of a check on you unless you apply for work here, I am entitled to check the people who are going to possibly come to work here, I think that makes sense. But we are a foreign intelligence operation and the provence of checking on Americans to the degree that the law permits that, is that of the FBI not of myself. No we've done no checking.

Q. Would you make some comments about the recent book on Saigon and the CIA . .

A. Yes. (Laughs) The one in controversy is Mr. Snepp's book, its before the courts and I have to be careful of what I say because I don't want to prejudice the case in the courts. But when you come to work for us we ask you to sign a secrecy agreement - an oath which says that when you leave here you will check with us before publishing a book or something of that size or shape so that we cannot censor you and your ideas but judging whether you are putting classified information out. Mr. Snepp signed such an agreement. When he came back from his duties in Vietnam he resigned from the Agency and announced that he was going to write a book. Last May 17th he came to see me in my office and wanted some help in getting some documents to help him with his book. I advised him, I asked him looking him in the eye will you give us your book for clearance, he said yes he would and he walked out the door and I tore up the piece of paper which was a draft requesting the Attorney General for an injunction against the publishing of his book because we suspected he was not intending to let us see it in accordance with his signed secrecy oath. I took him at his word, I made a mistake. He was not an honorable man in that regard, he published a book in a surreptitious manner and we feel that that is injurious to our interests and it is a breach of contract and we have taken it to court. In that respect, I think I'd better not say more and get into the court case.

Q. Inaudible

A. Gee, I'm glad I really had (Laughs)
In most countries of the world the FBI and the CIA type activities are combined in one. There might be some economies here but we feel that it's important in our democracy and under our constitution to keep law enforcement separate from intelligence activities. The law enforcement people do need to sometimes spy on Americans. They go out and they try to find out what a murderer is doing or where he is or how they locate him or a kidnapper who has a child or something like this. That's another...calling it spying is a little different word than they use but it's basically looking into the activities of American citizens who are breaking the law. We think there should be very tight control over looking into the activities of American citizens for the purposes of intelligence. Even though there is a lot of information there that could be of use to us in a very genuine proper way, we don't want to do that - we sacrifice that because none of us want to have our privacy invaded and that's where we came from in 1776 and that's the constitution and so we pay maybe a small expense for protecting that right by keeping these separate. But I would assure you ...inaudible....that we work very closely with the FBI. So I think there's a minimum of extra cost or expense for this. We have a very good, close relationship.

- Q. Admiral Turnerdifferent groundwhat are employees chances to do some damage to the nuclear arms which involves the military, involves the safety of all of us, involves our foreigninterest - what intelligence service broke down in that situation?
- A. Well it really isn't an intelligence service, that's the basic physical security service in the United States Air Force. They have their own responsibility to protect their equipment and you can call it intelligence in the sense that they try to keep a security around the place - they obviously have to be alert to anything they can learn about people attempting to penetrate it, but in a strict technical sense that does not come under my cognizance as the Director of Central Intelligence to coordinate all intelligence activities in the country, that's a security function.
- Q. There was a recent story in Reader's Digest regarding increased activity of the KGB in the United States. Would you care to remark on that?
- A. Yes, I believe there is increased activity of the KGB here. There are benefits to a greater policy of friendship and openness with the Soviet Union and there are some risks. There are many more Soviets who come to this country today than in years past. We have exchange agreements, scientific exchange of for instance, we have lots of Soviets ships coming here, merchant ships with sailors on them and each one of these because of the nature of the Soviet Union, is an opportunity for them to put a KGB agent ashore over here in the guise of one of these other legitimate activities. We believe that kind of activity has increased a great deal in recent years. It causes the FBI considerable problems, because it's their responsibility in the United States to monitor that kind of thing. It's my responsibility outside the United States.
- Q. Admiral, I'd like to have a..... biography show who what and.inaudible .. come face to face with people who are representing .. inaudible.. I would like to ask a question in the same vein and that is how does a small newspaper publisher themselves with intelligence talk to call Reader's Digest, call the New York Times, where do you go to find the basis for an editorial which in turn may have an effect on - where do you go?
- A. First, thank you Rod, I appreciate your plug and we really enjoyed those militaryconferences. We held them at the War College. We got all spector of the media to come up and ... inaudible..... We had a day and a half discussion and debate between military officers of all three services and the media and it some sparks but it was good, certainly for us and I hope it was of value to members of the media to see the military attitude towards some of these questions. You posed a most difficult

issue as to where you get the most authoritative information on the issues of national importance so that you can transmit the right communications to your readers and I just can't give you a very simple answer. I can say that by publishing over a hundred unclassified Central Intelligence Agency Studies in the past year, I hope I am helping you. You can subscribe to everything we publish by going to the Library of Congress, Document Exchange at the Library of Congress and you can sign up for everything unclassified which the Central Intelligence Agency publishes. Any idea what it costs George? No sir, I don't. Of course would be proportional to the number we put out every year so I guess it's a running bill or something that you get. Quite a few people, including the Russian Embassy, do this. (Laughs) They get two copies. Alternatively, when you hear we publish something, you can send to the Library of Congress for that individual item and then not have the expense of all of them. That's a drop in the bucket to the total problem. It's my attempt to help you with this and its one of the reasons we are publishing more so that you can get the best information available and draw your own conclusions from it. Beyond that you've got the same old scramble saying whose giving out the best material.

Q. Inaudible

A. Yes, I'm concerned about any attitude in the American public that we have done or are doing something that we shouldn't because we need your support. I have looked into that a fair amount since I've been here, I can't say that I've done an exhaustive search, but I assured myself that the Agency has done an exhaustive search in the past as to all the data on the Kennedy assassination. I also feel assured that everything of significance which we have on that has been passed to the appropriate law enforcement agencies and the executive branch of the Government and investigative committees in the legislative branch. So I think if there were any incriminating evidence that the CIA was involved in that plot in an improper way it would have been produced by now. In short, I am confident that there was no such activity on the part of the CIA and as to having an official report on that, I'm willing to stand up and say that, I don't know what more I can do or should do. Has there been any official statement? But we feel that everything we have that bears on that has been put forward and does not involve the CIA in an improper way.

Q. Admiral, President Nixon..... Is it still possible for a type individual to call you on the phone and direct you to spy on Americans or to assassinate a leader of a foreign country?

A. Of course, it's still possible that they can try it. It's more difficult because today there is a written directive to me, part of this executive order was already in existence in an executive order in President Ford's time. But no one in the Intelligence

Community will plan, contemplate or conduct an assassination, to answer that one specifically, I can still be fallible, mortal and give in to undue and improper pressure. One would think it very unlikely that in turn I could get away with it with all the people I would have to involve in doing it let's say. Somebody is going to have a spine in this organization because of a very express, signed by Jimmy Carter, order against that. Now, borderline things that you know are not that expressly forbidden, but clearly are not intended, yes, there can be pressure on me. All I can say is that you have to hope that the President officials who are either going to give those kind of orders or take those kind of orders. You have to also have some reassurance that there is this oversight process whereby somebody, if they didn't have the spine to stand up to me if I relayed an improper order and say no, Admiral, you can't do that, would run around me to the Intelligence Oversight Board or to the Senate Select Committee or somebody, you know, and report the thing which would lead to an uncovering of it. In short, Bernstein and Woodward have been today and fine. My object with Snapp and people like this is that they are blowing the whistle - I don't think he has anything much to toot about - but he's entitled to blow the whistle but I'd be a lot happier if he tried to blow them to the oversight boards first, through the mechanism that the country has established to provide that check and balance without thereby endangering the security issue at the same time.

- Q. Admiral, ...inaudible on American citizens
..... late 60's and they were convinced at that time that the CIA was tapping the telephone lines of campus leaders and Did you do that? And do you do that?
- A. Yes, no. (laughs) I - there were improper activities with regard to American citizens. We've recently been convicted in a court of opening mail and I've been ordered by the court to write a letter of apology and it's been done in the three cases where there has been a court conviction. So yes, there were some improper things done in the past with regard to surveillance of American citizens, no, we are not doing that now and yes we have destroyed the files on that with some limitation because we've also had the rule put on us for other reasons that you can't destroy anything under certain categories and you know also there is just a manpower problem. We are not using those files and we are getting rid of them as fast as we legally can.
- Q. Inaudible
- A. The cuts have all been in the clandestine service and I oversimplified it. They were not only to make room for a flow of promotion, a flow of input, they were because we were overstaffed.

And you can't attract good people in or keep good people in the middle grades when they are under utilized or over supervised, and that's where we were. And it's been acknowledged in this Agency for years and hardly anybody today, if you walk around the corridors would question, no matter how much he might have disliked the cuts, particularly if he were cut, would question the need for having cuts. The analytic portion of the Agency has increased in size during my time because I think we needed it so we have taken the cuts where they were necessary in our opinion and we have increased where it's necessary. Finally, let me add that one reason the clandestine service particularly needed the cuts in order to provide this orderly progression is again your business. Almost any other, if all of your vice presidents retired at about the same time, you have a problem with your organization. But not an insoluble problem. You can go out and hire somebody from across the isle here to come to work for you because you are all in the same basic business. But the only other organization in my business is the KGB. (Laughs)

- Q. Your reaction sir, toinaudible....
reporters and others who are assigned to watch
.... Is this dangerous? Do you care to comment....?
- A. Although very concerned when the press gets a hold of something that's very secretive and it becomes public information. But your job is to get information and to publish it. You have your own ethics and standards as to what you should publish and what you shouldn't. I pass no judgment on whether you should decide that this piece of information is too injurious to the country to publish or whether your responsibility via Bernstein and Woodward overrides that and you should publish it. But I'm going to do everything I can to keep you from getting any classified information. I'm sorry, everything I can within the law within the right procedures (laughs) to keep you from doing it. I've taken some steps since I've been here to prevent leaks. But the complementary part is a greater openness.
- Q. Because the souls of the nations of the world are virtually open to you essentially, what kind of security do you have? What is your personal life like?
- A. I don't have personal concerns with security, me personally. I've been here 365 days today and I've had no cause for alarm of any sort. I do have an Agency security man who travels with me when I go around on my appointed rounds in the city. Inaudible
but I frequently shake my tail (laughs)
You know I'm just a normal citizen on Saturday night, I take my wife and get in the car and go to the movie or whatever. I don't have any concerns, when I travel abroad I'm a little more cautious. I don't publicize where I'm going to go because of the terrorist fanatics and things around the world. But, no, I don't have any particular concern. Besides, I'm so busy at night reading

material that I don't have much time to get exposed.

Q. Last year we were under the impression that the Soviet Union was having a difficult uh was having a bumper crop and therefore it seemed to drive our farm prices down. When the prices were driven down the announcement was the crops were no so good and they were able to buy our surplus at a lower price. Did you provide information that was incorrect?

A. Yes, we provided information that was incorrect, we're sorry. We missed by 10% our estimate of the Soviet grain harvest. We've only been in the grain harvest business five years. Typical of the expansion of our efforts and there's some things happened this year that the formula we use didn't work as well as it should have. We're sorry. We also predicted and passed out information that the Soviets were entering the grain market and were going to buy grain. We didn't necessarily associate that with a lower harvest, although that seems logical. But prices were down in August, and it was possible they were buying for their stockpile not because they needed it to meet a lower harvest. In fact, we think that my still have been it, because they had a very bad weather situation in September and the Department of Agriculture frequently misses the U.S. forecast by 5% and so I'm not trying to excuse it, I'm not trying to say we're going to do better but we also think we did not see a major increase in the price when the President made his announcement. And of course everybody believes the President and not me. But because we have conditioned grain marketed, the fact that the Soviets were in the market.... likely to be in it more.

Q. Inaudible.

A. Yes, the 39 offices we have across the nation are there to be our contact with the American public. They are there to be a place that any one of you may go and say I'd like to volunteer some information that I have that I believe is important to our government. They do go out and contact American citizens, American business whom we think have information and ask would you please, and I'm from the CIA, here's my credentials would you please talk to me about your trip to the Soviet Union or so forth. It's perfectly open and above board. The last thing I ever want to do is to send a spy on a risky, chancey, expensive operation to collect information which was sitting here in.....

Q. Why do we go outinaudible

A. Well, I'm not sure its 95% of our problem but that's a much broader policy issue. We, of course, are now able to go to the Soviet Union much more as a citizen, and I personally think that a policy of greater openness between nations will benefit the open society like ours much more than it would a closed one. Yes, they will gain more intelligence from us by coming here but the opening up of the Soviet Union which is so tightly closed, is

going to have a major impact on them much more, I think, than their ability to penetrate us by far.

Q. Inaudible

A. CIA/FBI Relationship. There's no question with what you're referring to. In the last part of J. Edgar Hoover's term there was a bad relationship between the FBI and the CIA. It had in my opinion been quite completely corrected before I got here. I've had very good relationships with Clarence Kelley. I've watched and I've seen the liaison between our working level people as being very good. It just so happens the President picked a new Director of the FBI who is a college classmate of mine and a good friend at college and I have my first business meeting with him next Monday at lunch and I look forward to that happenstance of personal relationship being a good opportunity to insure the same strong, warm relationship. It's very important to the country. We overlap in what's called counterintelligence, finding out who and how is spying against us. They do it inside, we do it outside so when a spy goes from a foreign country to ours we have to pass them all off to them so coordination is critical.

Q. Admiral, I hope it's not a three-martini lunch. (laughs)

A. Neither one of us happen to drink as a matter of fact.

Q. I've been reading a lot in the today about the upcoming strength of the Soviet Union in the naval porportion. Would you care to comment on this?

A. The Soviet Union over the past several decades has really put a major emphasis on its naval power, built from an insignificant naval force in the early 50's to very, very credible ... one today. I don't think it's the number one navy by any question, we still have the most powerful and the most effective navy. But why have they made this major investment in land power not dependent upon sea lines of communication as are we. I think primarily because they want to be a superpower, an international power in every department and because they see that they cannot really project their national power away from the physical borders without this ability. They are building up their merchant marine also to carry their trade and they are building up their energy to support it to project the Soviet influence abroad.

Q. Admiral, we appreciate your time, we